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Abstract
This paper describes the design, implementation, and evalu-
ation of Otak, a system that allows two non-colluding cloud
providers to run machine learning (ML) inference without
knowing the inputs to inference. Prior work for this problem
mostly relies on advanced cryptography such as two-party se-
cure computation (2PC) protocols that provide rigorous guar-
antees but suffer from high resource overhead. Otak improves
efficiency via a new 2PC protocol that (i) tailors recent primi-
tives such as function and homomorphic secret sharing to ML
inference, and (ii) uses trusted hardware in a limited capac-
ity to bootstrap the protocol. At the same time, Otak reduces
trust assumptions on trusted hardware by running a small
code inside the hardware, restricting its use to a preprocessing
step, and distributing trust over heterogeneous trusted hard-
ware platforms from different vendors. An implementation
and evaluation of Otak demonstrates that its CPU and network
overhead converted to a dollar amount is 5.4–385× lower than
state-of-the-art 2PC-based works. Besides, Otak’s trusted com-
puting base (code inside trusted hardware) is only 1,300 lines
of code, which is 14.6–29.2× lower than the code-size in prior
trusted hardware-based works.
1 Introduction
How can a machine learning (ML) system running in the
cloud perform inference without getting access to the inputs to
inference (model parameters and the data points whose class
is being inferred)?
This question is motivated by a fundamental tension be-
tween ease-of-use and confidentiality of user data. On the one
hand, cloud providers expose easy-to-use ML APIs [4, 47, 77].
A user can call them with model parameters and input data
points, and receive inference results while treating ML as
a black-box. Furthermore, the user does not have to provi-
sion and manage ML systems locally. On the other hand,
ML APIs require inputs in plaintext. Thus, a user’s sensi-
tive or proprietary model parameters and data points can
be accessed by rogue system administrators at the cloud
provider [31, 39, 113], hackers who can get into the cloud
provider’s infrastructure [12, 102], and government agen-
cies [3, 46, 75, 76].
Given the wide array of ML applications, the need to bal-
ance the benefits and confidentiality-risks of cloud-hosted ML
services has received significant attention (§2.4). A long line
of work relies on cryptographic techniques [10, 11, 14, 16,
24, 26, 27, 29, 42, 53, 60, 62, 68, 72, 73, 80, 82, 83, 91, 92,
94, 104, 105, 109]. These works provide rigorous guarantees
but incur high resource overhead (CPU consumption, network
transfers, etc.). For example, for a single inference over the
ResNet-32 model [52], state-of-the-art systems that run over
two non-colluding cloud providers [64, 83] make over 6 GB
of expensive, wide-area network transfers (§7.4).
In a quest to avoid expensive cryptography, researchers have
resorted to using trusted execution environments (TEEs). A
TEE consists of a secure container that can execute a program
such that an external entity peeking inside the container learns
only the input-output behavior of the computation. Secure
systems developed using TEEs not only are less complex (and
hence, easier to build) but also offer significant efficiency
benefits over their counterparts built only using cryptography.
Indeed, there are many highly efficient systems developed
over the years [38, 54–56, 84, 85, 99, 100]. For instance, the
PRIVADO system for ML inference incurs less than 20%
overhead relative to a non-private system [99].
However, TEEs are a not a panacea for building secure
systems. Over the years, researchers have discovered various
cryptanalytic attacks. First, the code inside a TEE can leak
sensitive data through bugs and digital side-channels [23, 32,
49, 70, 81, 103, 110], although these leaks can be mitigated
by making code data-oblivious [56, 85, 89, 99], and formally
proving the absence of digital side-channels and bugs [15].
Second, TEEs can leak data through analog side-channels
such as power draw, and physical side-channels such as bus
tapping [40, 41, 65]. Third, current systems use a single TEE
which opens up the possibility that the hardware designer or
someone along the supply chain injects a backdoor into the
hardware [30, 36, 93, 106]. Thus, current TEE-based systems
also rely on the assumption that the TEE vendor is trustworthy.
We introduce Otak, a new two-server ML inference system
in the honest-but-curious model. Otak uses cryptography but
runs a piece of functionality inside TEEs to remove some
weight from cryptography, giving a substantially less expen-
sive system that solely using cryptography. The use of TEEs
does create a trusted computing base (TCB), consisting of
both the code that runs inside the TEEs, and the hardware
design and implementation of the TEE itself. However, Otak
lowers the size of the TCB, by (i) reducing the size of the
functionality running inside the TEE, (ii) distributing trust
over heterogeneous TEEs from different vendors such that
the confidentiality of the system is preserved even if a TEE is
compromised.
Otak performs (i) and (ii) above for reducing TCB size in
two progressive design steps that we call reducing-TEE-code
and distributing-trust.
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Techniques for reducing-TEE-code step. Otak starts by ob-
serving that ML inference computation for many types of
models, particularly, neural networks, can be expressed as a
series of layers, where each layer performs either a linear com-
putation (a vector-matrix product) or a non-linear computation
(an activation function such as Rectified Linear Unit or ReLU),
or both (§2.1). Thus, a secure solution for ML inference re-
quires sub-protocols for linear and non-linear computations.
A common way to perform these computations over two
servers is to use the Beaver multiplication protocol to compute
vector-matrix products [13] and Yao’s garbled circuit proto-
col [111] to compute non-linear functions. Further, Beaver’s
protocol requires the two servers to hold correlated random-
ness called Beaver triple shares, which is typically generated
using additive homomorphic encryption [64, 83]. A challenge
with existing protocols is that both Beaver triple generation
and Yao’s protocol incur significant expense. For instance,
Yao’s protocol requires transferring a verbose Boolean circuit
representation of the non-linear function between the servers.
Otak makes two changes to this protocol. First, instead of
using additive homomorphic encryption to generate Beaver
triple shares, it uses a new protocol based on homomorphic
secret sharing or HSS [18, 21, 22] (§4). This protocol contains
a packing technique that optimally uses the input space of HSS
operations, thereby reducing overhead relative to additive ho-
momorphic encryption-based solutions. For instance, network
overhead in Otak’s protocol for a vector-matrix product over a
matrix with 1024× 1024 entries is at least 7.6× lower relative
to prior work (§7.2).
Second, Otak replaces Yao’s general-purpose protocol with
a recent protocol of Boyle, Gilboa, and Ishai (BGI) [20] that
is efficient for computing non-linear functions. This protocol
consumes slightly more CPU than Yao, but incurs significantly
lower network overhead (for instance, by 460× for the ReLU
function; §7.3).
The BGI protocol is promising; however, applying it to ML
inference creates two issues. First, the protocol, as described
in the literature can efficiently encode the ReLU function (and
approximations of Sigmoid and Tanh) but not the MaxPool
and Argmax functions [20, 95] (§3). The core issue is that the
BGI protocol depends on the function secret sharing (FSS)
primitive [17, 19], whose current constructions exist only for
two functions, a point function and an interval functions, that
do not naturally encode the max function. The second issue
with the BGI protocol is that it assumes that the two servers
hold correlated randomness: shares of keys for FSS.
Otak fixes the first issue via new encodings of MaxPool and
Argmax atop point and interval functions (§3). These encod-
ings may be of independent interest. Otak fixes the second
issue by generating the FSS keys inside a TEE per server.
Since all non-linear functions further call just the point and
interval functions, the code for FSS key generation is small.
Techniques for distributing-trust step. The protocol so far
is efficient but contains TEEs as a single point of attack. In
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FIGURE 1—An example CNN with two layers. Each layer computes
a vector-matrix product (e.g., z1 = x1 · Y1) and applies a non-linear
function (e.g., ReLU).
the distributing-trust step, Otak takes FSS key generation from
inside the TEEs and distributes it over multiple, heterogeneous
TEEs from different vendors. In particular, Otak replaces one
TEE per server with three TEEs per server and runs a three-
party secure computation protocol (3PC) over the TEEs such
that an adversary does not learn the FSS keys even if it corrupts
one of the TEEs.
General-purpose 3PC protocols can be expensive. However,
Otak again notes that all ML non-linear functions can be
encoded on top of the point and interval functions. So it devises
a new customized 3PC protocol for the limited functionality
of generating FSS keys for point and interval functions. Otak’s
customized protocol is cheaper, for instance, by 30× in terms
of network transfers, relative to a general solution (§5).
Evaluation results. We have implemented (§6) and evaluated
(§7) a prototype of Otak. Our prototype runs over two cloud
providers, Microsoft Azure and Amazon AWS, with multiple
TEE machines per provider. Our prototype demonstrates two
properties of Otak. First, its code inside the TEE is 14.6–
29.2× smaller relative to existing single TEE-based systems
(in absolute terms, it is less than 1,300 lines of code). Second,
for several ML models including a 32-layer ResNet-32 [52],
and for several datasets including those for speech and image
recognition, Otak’s dollar cost to perform inference (that is,
CPU and network consumption converted to a dollar amount) is
5.4–385× lower than prior state-of-the-art cryptography-based
works that run over two non-colluding servers.
2 Overview of Otak
2.1 Private outsourced ML inference
Otak targets the problem of private outsourced ML inference.
This problem revolves around three parties: an ML model
owner, a service provider, and a data point owner. The model
owner trains a model and deploys it at the service provider,
whose task is to label new data points supplied by the data
point owner against the model, for example, tell whether an
image contains a human or not. The privacy aspect of the
problem requires that (a) the service provider must not learn
the model parameters or the data points, (b) the model owner
must not learn the data points, and (c) the data point owner
must learn only the inference result.
While many types of ML models exist, Otak focuses on
2
Corr. 
rand
inference 
request, responseLoad model
Model owner Data point owner
General 
purpose 
machines
Secure 
hw
Data point owner
S0 on Amazon AWS S1 on Microsoft Azure
inference 
request, response
General 
purpose 
machines
Secure 
hw
Crypto
Corr. 
rand
Corr. 
rand
Service provider
FIGURE 2—Otak’s high-level architecture.
neural networks [44, 51], in particular, feedforward neural
networks (FNNs) and convolutional neural networks (CNNs),
for two reasons. First, FNNs and CNNs have a wide array
of applications, from speech recognition [1], to computer vi-
sion [67], to chemical analysis [97]. Second, one can express
inference for other models such as support vector machines,
Naive Bayes, and regression as inference over FNNs [83].
Fundamentally, FNNs and CNNs rely on slightly different
building blocks. For instance, the former employs dense lay-
ers while the latter additionally uses convolutions. However,
one can abstract inference for both types of models into a
common structure. This structure is a series of layers, where
each layer computes a vector-matrix product and applies a
non-linear function such as ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit),
Sigmoid, MaxPool, Argmax, and Tanh to the product [44].
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of an example CNN.
2.2 Architecture
Figure 2 shows Otak’s architecture. Otak consists of a ser-
vice provider, and multiple model and data point owners. The
service provider runs two servers, S0 and S1, in separate ad-
ministrative domains such as Microsoft Azure and Amazon
AWS. Each server contains TEE machines from different ven-
dors (labeled collectively as “secure hw” in the figure), and
general-purpose compute machines (labeled collectively as
“general-purpose machines” in the figure).
At a high level, Otak’s protocol to privately outsource in-
ference has four phases: setup, model-loading, preprocessing,
and online.
• Setup: The setup phase (not depicted in Figure 2) runs once
between the Otak’s two servers. During setup, the servers
generate long-lived cryptographic material such as seeds
for a pseudorandom number generator. This cryptographic
material is reused across all inference requests.
• Model-loading: This phase (dashed arrows in Fig. 2) runs
once per model. In this phase, the model owner uploads
secret-shares (over a field) of the model parameters to the
two servers, who transform and store them. We denote shMPb
as the share given by model owner to Sb, for b ∈ {0, 1}.
• Preprocessing: The preprocessing phase runs once per in-
ference, and precedes the online phase. In the preprocessing
phase (depicted by dotted arrows in Figure 2), Otak’s servers
generate correlated randomness (depicted as “corr rand” in
the figure). This correlated randomness does not depend on
the values of the model parameters or the data points. This
phase uses the TEE machines.
• Online: The online phase (depicted by solid arrows in Fig-
ure 2) runs once per inference and is input-dependent. In
this phase, the data point owner uploads secret-shares (over
a field) of its data point to the two servers (we denote the
share shDPb as the share given to Sb), who run a cryptographic
protocol using these shares and the outputs from the other
phases, and generate shares of the inference label. Finally,
each server sends its share of the label to the data point
owner, who combines the shares to get the actual label.
Definition 2.1 (Correctness). For every input shMPb ∈
{0, 1}poly(λ), shDPb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) (corresponding to a data-
point DP sent by the data-point owner, and additive secret-
shares of model parameters MP = {Y0, Y1, ..., YL−1} for a
L-layer model sent by the model-owner) to Sb, the reconstruc-
tion of the secret-shares output by both servers S0, S1 equals
the prediction output of applying the model with parameters
MP to input DP.
2.3 Threat model and security definitions
Otak considers an honest-but-curious adversary. This adver-
sary follows the description of the protocol but tries to infer
sensitive data by inspecting protocol messages. Below, we
formally define Otak’s security notion.
We consider two settings, namely single-TEE and multiple-
TEE, depending on how many TEEs Otak’s servers employ.
In the single-TEE setting, Otak’s servers use one TEE each.1
We denote the TEE used by Sb as Tb, for b ∈ {0, 1}. Further,
we denote the functionality implemented by Tb as Fb. Finally,
we denote non-TEE machines at Sb collectively as Mb. In the
multiple-TEE setting, each server uses three types of TEEs
(made by three different vendors); we denote Sb’s three types
of TEEs by T(i)b for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that i-th TEE T(i)b
implements functionality F (i)b . We define security for the two
settings separately.
Definition 2.2 (Single-TEE security). A single-TEE Otak
scheme consisting of setup, model-loading, preprocessing,
and online phases is said to be ε-secure if for any honest-but-
curious (passive) probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adver-
sary A corrupting Mb for b ∈ {0, 1} with access to TEE Tb
implementing Fb, for every large enough security parameter
λ, there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that the following
holds:
for all inputs shMPb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), shDPb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) to
Sb, randomness rb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ),
{ViewFbA (1λ, shMPb , shDPb ; rb)} ≈c,ε
1The TEE is logically centralized but may be distributed over many physical
TEE machines of the same type.
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{Sim(1λ, shMPb , shDPb , rb)}.
If ε is negligible in the security parameter, we drop ε in the
above definition.
Definition 2.3 (Multiple-TEE security). A multiple-TEE Otak
scheme consisting of setup, model-loading, preprocessing, and
online phases is said to be ε-secure if, for any honest-but-
curious (passive) probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adver-
sary A corrupting Mb, T(i)b , T(i)1−b for b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {0, 1, 2},
with access to TEEs T(j)b , T
(k)
b implementing F (j)b ,F (k)b respec-
tively, for j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ̸= i, k ̸= i, for every large
enough security parameter λ, there exists a PPT simulator
Sim such that the following holds:
for all inputs shMPb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ), shDPb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ) to
Sb, randomness rb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ),
{ViewF
(j)
b ,F(k)b
A (1
λ, shMPb , sh
DP
b ; rb)} ≈c,ε
{Sim(1λ, shMPb , shDPb , rb)}.
If ε is negligible in the security parameter, we drop ε in the
above definition.
Remark. We assume that TEEs T(i)b , T
(i)
1−b come from the same
manufacturer.
We do not consider attacks such as membership inference [96]
and model stealing [101] that aim to infer membership in
training dataset or learn approximate model parameters by
observing the black-box behavior of the ML inference system.
Although this leakage is an important concern, secure com-
putation alone cannot prevent it. However, defending against
such attacks is an active area of research [59, 61, 86]. Besides,
these attacks are immaterial when the entity receiving infer-
ence outputs also owns the model (that is, when a model owner
remotely deploys a model for its own consumption).
2.4 Prior approaches and related work
Several approaches exist in the literature for privately out-
sourcing the task of inference over FNNs and CNNs. Here,
we compare Otak with these prior approaches. While doing
the comparison, we include prior works for a restricted setting
where the service provider has access to model parameters in
plaintext, as the techniques developed for this restricted setting
are related to the techniques in Otak’s fully-outsourced setting
that also hides model parameters.
One can split prior works into two broad categories: those
that rely on TEEs for their security guarantees and those that
rely only on cryptography.
TEE-based works. The works based on TEEs use the popular
Intel SGX TEE [38, 54–56, 84, 85, 99, 100]. Many of these
works [54–56, 85, 99] run a complete ML system inside the
TEE. This approach is efficient as the code runs natively on
the CPU. However, as indicated earlier (§1), systems based on
a single, general-purpose TEE are vulnerable to many attacks.
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FIGURE 3—Otak’s design steps. Dotted and solid arrows respectively
show computation performed during preprocessing and online phases
of inference.
Slalom [100], Origami [84], and DFAuth [38] also use Intel
SGX, but, like Otak, move parts of inference outside of the
TEE. However, these prior systems use the TEE during the
online phase of inference, while Otak restricts TEE use to a
preprocessing phase. Moreover, Otak removes TEE as a single
point of failure by securely distributing trust over heteroge-
neous TEEs. (Note that, unlike Otak, Slalom and Origami do
not hide model parameters from the service provider.)
Cryptography-based works. The alternative approach to us-
ing TEEs is to use cryptographic constructs. In particular, a
long line of works focuses on building secure ML inference
either from secure multiparty computation (MPC) [11, 27, 62,
68, 72, 80, 82, 83, 91, 92, 94, 104, 105], or fully homomor-
phic encryption (FHE) [10, 14, 16, 24, 26, 29, 42, 53, 60, 73,
95, 109]. However, all these works incur higher overhead in
comparison with TEE-based solutions. For instance, a recent
state-of-the-art system, Glyph [73], based on FHE, requires
2n homomorphic operations for a non-linear function over a
n-bit input. Otak focuses on the two-server secure computation
(2PC) setting; its CPU and network overhead, when converted
to dollars, is 5.4-385× lower than prior 2PC works for this
setting (§7.4). One can say that Otak’s use of TEEs helps
accelerate cryptography.
2.5 Design approach
As stated in the introduction (§1), Otak adopts the two-step
approach of reducing-TEE-code and distributing-trust for its
design. Figure 3 depicts these two steps.
At a high level, Otak starts with a solution that runs ML in-
ference (all four phases) inside a single TEE. It then, gradually,
via the reducing-TEE-code, moves most of the computation,
particularly, the frequently invoked preprocessing and online
phases, from inside the TEE to outside the TEE. This step
is further divided into two sub-steps: the first sub-step com-
pletely gets rid of TEE in the online phase, and the second
sub-step splits the preprocessing phase such that the bulk of
preprocessing also happens outside the TEE. As a result, Otak
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greatly simplifies the computation being performed inside the
TEE. Finally, to avoid a single point of attack, Otak employs a
secure computation protocol over the computation inside the
TEEs to distribute trust among multiple, heterogeneous TEEs.
First part of reducing-TEE-code: online phase without
TEE. In this first sub-step of reducing-TEE-code (first row in
Figure 3), the TEEs at the two servers run the complete prepro-
cessing phase. In particular, they generate two types of input-
independent correlated randomness: Beaver triple shares [13]
and keys for a cryptographic protocol due to Boyle, Gilboa,
and Ishai (BGI) [20]. Meanwhile, the non-TEE machines run
the complete online phase (§3).
Second part of reducing-TEE-code: less hardware, more
software for the preprocessing phase. In the second sub-step
of reducing-TEE-code (illustrated in the middle row in Fig-
ure 3), Otak moves a major part of the preprocessing phase—
the generation of Beaver triple shares—outside of TEEs. To
generate these shares efficiently, the non-TEE machines at
Otak’s two servers run an optimized cryptographic protocol
based on a recent primitive called homomorphic secret sharing
or HSS [18, 21, 22] (§4). After the second sub-step of reducing-
TEE-code, like a special-purpose cryptoprocessor [9, 57, 58],
the TEE machines run the specialized task of generating keys
for the BGI protocol.
Distributing-trust. Otak’s distributing-trust step (illustrated
in the bottom row in Figure 3) reduces trust on TEEs, by
distributing the task of generating keys for BGI onto multiple
TEEs. To distribute key-generation efficiently, Otak uses a
new, customized three-party secure computation protocol that
achieves lower overhead (both CPU consumption and network
transfers) than a general-purpose protocol, by shifting the
computation of a pseudorandom generator (PRG) (which is
the bulk of the computation in the key generation procedure)
outside of the general-purpose protocol (§5).
The next three sections (§3, §4, §5) dwell exhaustively on
the details of these design steps.
3 Details of first part of reducing-TEE-code
This section describes Otak’s protocol for the first part of its
reducing-TEE-code step. To begin with, we focus on one layer
of inference, that is, computing one vector-matrix product and
applying a non-linear function to the output of the product
(§2.1); later in this section, we will relax this assumption.
Figure 4 shows Otak’s protocol for one layer of inference.
Say that the vector is x ∈ Z1×np and the matrix is Y ∈ Zn×mp ,
then the protocol computes f (x · Y) ∈ Z1×m′p , where m′ ≤ m,
and f is the non-linear function such as ReLU or MaxPool.
The vector x is the data point from the data point owner or
the output of the previous layer; the matrix Y encodes model
parameters. All arithmetic is in the field Zp for a prime p.
Underneath, the protocol composes Beaver’s secure multi-
plication protocol [13] with a protocol due to Boyle, Gilboa,
and Ishai (BGI) [20]. The Beaver part securely computes the
vector-matrix product: it takes as input the shares of the vector
x and matrix Y, and the shares of a Beaver triple (a, B, c),
and generates shares of the vector-matrix product z = x · Y.
For an unfamiliar reader, the Beaver triple (a, B, c) is a vector-
matrix product over a random vector and matrix. That is, a
and B are sampled uniformly at random with elements in Zp,
dim(a) = dim(x), dim(B) = dim(Y), and c = a · B.
The BGI part of the protocol computes the non-linear func-
tion: it starts with the shares of the vector-matrix product z, and
the shares of the non-linear function f , and computes the shares
of the non-linear function applied to the product, that is, shares
of f (z). A key enabler of the BGI protocol is the function se-
cret sharing (FSS) primitive (FSS.Gen, FSS.Eval) [17, 19].
FSS.Gen splits a function f into two secret shares f0 and f1,
called FSS keys, such that f0(x) + f1(x) = f (x). FSS.Eval
evaluates a share fb, for b ∈ {0, 1}, on an input x to give a
share of f (x) (this happens in step 9 in Figure 4).
The Beaver triples and FSS keys form input-independent
correlated randomness. The protocol uses the TEE machines
to generate this randomness during the preprocessing phase.
Supporting multiple layers of inference. The protocol above
works for one layer of inference. To support multiple layers,
Otak replicates the computation inside each phase (except
the setup phase) as many times as the number of layers. It
then connects copies of the online phase for adjacent layers.
Specifically, it feeds the output of step 9, which is a vector in
Zp, to step 7, which expects a vector of the same type.
Lack of expressibility and fixes. There are two issues with
expressibility of the described protocol. First, it assumes arith-
metic over the field Zp, whereas neural networks perform
arithmetic over floating-point numbers. Otak addresses this
issue by borrowing standard techniques from the literature to
encode floating-point arithmetic as field arithmetic [80, 83].
The conversion results in a drop in inference accuracy; how-
ever, this drop is small (§7.4).
The second issue with expressibility is that the BGI part of
the protocol can directly handle only certain ML non-linear
functions. The restriction is due to the fact that efficient FSS
constructions currently exist only for two functions: a point
function f βα that outputs β at the point α and zero other-
wise, and the interval function f β(α1,α2)(x) that outputs β if
α1 ≤ x ≤ α2 and zero otherwise. These functions can ex-
press a piece-wise polynomial (that is, a spline) function [20],
which in turn can encode the ReLU function and several close
approximations [8] of Sigmoid and Tanh. However, a spline
cannot directly encode the MaxPool and Argmax functions.
Normally, one would express a max over two values as
max(x, y) = sign(x− y) · (x− y) + y, where the sign function
(which is a spline) returns 1 if its input is positive and zero
otherwise. However, this formulation of max does not work
when the inputs x, y are in Zp. For example, consider the case
where x = 5, y = 3, and p = 7. For this case, y > x (x ≥ 4 is
considered negative) but sign(x−y) = 1 (+ve). The problem is
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Otak’s protocol for first part of its reducing-TEE-code step
• This protocol has two parties, S0 and S1. It computes shares of f (x · Y), where vector x is in Z1×np , matrix Y is in Zn×mp , and f
is a non-linear function. We denote sh(x)b and sh
(Y)
b to be Sb’s shares of x and Y respectively.
• The protocol assumes that Sb has a TEE machine Tb and a general-purpose machine Mb. It also assumes several cryptographic
primitives, as described below.
Setup phase
1. T0, T1 establish a common seed for a pseudorandom function using the Diffie-Hellman protocol [28, 34].
Model-loading phase
2. Tb samples B ∈R Zn×mp and outputs its share sh(B)b to Mb.
3. (Receive model parameters Y) M0 and M1 respectively receive sh
(Y)
0 and sh
(Y)
1 from the model owner.
4. (Mask Y) M0 and M1 obtain F = Y− B, which is a masked version of Y. To obtain F, Sb computes sh(F)b = sh(Y)b − sh(B)b ,
sends sh(F)b to S1−b, receives sh
(F)
1−b from S1−b, and computes F = sh
(F)
0 + sh
(F)
1 .
Preprocessing phase
5. (Generate Beaver triple shares) Tb samples a ∈R Z1×np and computes c = a ·B. It gives the Beaver triple share (shab, shBb , shcb)
to Mb.
6. (Generate FSS keys) Tb samples r ∈R Z1×mp and outputs its share sh(r)b to Mb. Tb also computes FSS keys, k0 and k1, such
that (k0, k1)← FSS.Gen
(
1λ, f̂r
)
, where f̂r(in) = f (in− r) is an offset function for f . Tb outputs key kb to Mb.
Online phase
7. Mb receives sh
(x)
b from the data point owner (or from the output of step 9).
8. (Beaver multiplication) Mb takes matrix F from the model-loading phase, Beaver triple share (shab, shBb , shcb) from the
preprocessing phase, sh(x)b from the above step, and performs Beaver multiplication [13]. Mb obtains the output sh
(x·Y)
b .
9. (BGI evaluation) Mb takes its share of x ·Y from the above step, and FSS key kb and randomness sh(r)b from the preprocessing
phase, and outputs sh(f (x·Y))b using the BGI protocol [20].
FIGURE 4—This protocol composes the Beaver multiplication protocol for computing vector-matrix products [13] with the function secret
sharing (FSS)-based BGI protocol for computing non-linear functions [20]. The two sub-protocols require correlated randomness, which is
generated using TEE machines during the preprocessing phase.
that Zp (when it encodes both positive and negative numbers)
is not a totally ordered set.
There are many details to how Otak encodes Maxpool and
Argmax as a composition of point and interval functions;
we leave these details to Appendices A.1 and A.2. However,
Otak’s key idea is to split the computation into two parts: when
both x and y have the same sign, and when they do not. For
the former case, that is, when both x and y are either both
positive or both negative, sign(x − y) gives the right answer.
Therefore, one can write max(x, y) = ReLU(x− y) + y. For
the case when x and y have different signs, one can write
max(x, y) = ReLU(x) + ReLU(y). Otak composes these two
cases, again by using just point and interval functions.
We note that Ryffel et al. in parallel work also encode
MaxPool and Argmax using point and interval functions [95].
However, their protocol assumes a trusted third party (besides
the two servers). Furthermore, their encoding limits the inputs
to a small subset of Zp, and incurs network overhead that
is quadratic in the number of input entries to MaxPool and
Argmax. In contrast, Otak’s encoding does not have an input
restriction, and incurs network overhead linear in the number
of input entries to MaxPool and Argmax.
Cost analysis. The cost of setup and model-loading phases in
Figure 4 gets amortized across inference requests as model
parameters typically change infrequently. Here, we discuss net-
work and CPU costs for the preprocessing and online phases.
Network overhead. In terms of network, the preprocess-
ing phase requires the TEE machines to transfer correlated
randomness (Beaver triple shares and FSS keys) to general-
purpose machines. These data transfers are within a sin-
gle administrative domain and cheap. Indeed, popular cloud
providers do not charge for intra-domain transfers within a ge-
ographical zone [48, 78]. The online phase incurs inter-server
(wide-area) network overhead equal to the size of x plus a
small multiple of the size of z = x · Y. The first term is due
to the Beaver part (step 8 in Figure 4), while the second term
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is due to the BGI evaluation part (step 9 in Figure 4). Note
that, in contrast, prior work that uses 2PC between two servers
(§2.4) uses Yao’s garbled circuits [111] for non-linear func-
tions, whose network overhead is much higher—a multiple of
the verbose Boolean circuit representation of the non-linear
function. For instance, for ReLU, Otak’s implementation of
BGI costs 18 bytes while a recent and optimized implementa-
tion of Yao [112] costs 8.3 KB (§7.3).
CPU overhead. In terms of CPU, the Beaver part computes
vector-matrix products over small numbers in Zp (p is a 52-bit
prime in our implementation). Meanwhile, the BGI part runs
FSS.Gen and FSS.Eval over the point and interval functions.
The CPU for FSS procedures is higher than for Yao (for exam-
ple, for ReLU, 1.3 ms versus 0.45 ms in Yao; §7.2) as both
FSS.Gen and FSS.Eval internally make many calls to AES
(for example, FSS.Eval for an interval function over a p-bit
input performs 8 · log p AES encryptions). However, since CPU
is a much cheaper resource than network consumption, the
reduction in network overhead outweighs the increase in CPU.
Security analysis. The protocol described in Figure 4 satisfies
the single-TEE security definition in §2.3 (Appendix C.1).
4 Details of second part of reducing-TEE-code
A limitation of the protocol in the previous section is the high
amount of computation performed by the TEE machines at
the two servers (steps 5 and 6 in Figure 4). In particular, the
TEE machines generate FSS keys and Beaver triple shares.
Moreover, the latter requires a substantial amount of code
inside the TEEs: not only does the TEE compute vector-matrix
products but it also runs code to maintain state outside the TEE:
for each layer of every model, step 2 in Figure 4 samples and
stores a matrix B, and step 5 reuses this state across inference
requests to generate triples. Therefore, Otak’s second part of
reducing-TEE-code step moves Beaver triple generation to
general-purpose (non-TEE) machines (M0 and M1).
Observe that the first two components of a Beaver triple
(a, B, c) are sampled uniformly at random. Therefore, Mb
can locally sample its shares sh(a)b and sh
(B)
b as the sums
a = sh(a)0 + sh
(a)
1 (mod p) and B = sh
(B)
0 + sh
(B)
1 (mod p)
are also uniformly random. To obtain shares of c = a · B
from shares of a and B, prior work offers several two-server
protocols [62–64, 80, 83]. However, these protocols incur a
high inter-server (wide-area) network overhead. For instance,
for a vector with 128 entries and a matrix with 128 × 128
entries, the network overhead of a additive homomorphic
encryption-based protocol used in the state-of-the-art prior
works [62, 64, 80] is over 1,000 times the size of the vector.
Instead of using prior homomorphic encryption-based pro-
tocols, Otak uses a new protocol based on a primitive called
homomorphic secret sharing (HSS) that has received much
attention recently [18, 21, 22, 37]. Otak’s HSS-based proto-
col significantly reduces (amortized) network overhead—for
instance, to 16× the size of the vector for the specific ex-
ample above. However, obtaining this performance requires
addressing two challenges of applying HSS to Beaver triple
generation. This section gives a necessary background on HSS,
explains the challenges, and describes Otak’s protocol.
4.1 Overview of Homomorphic secret sharing (HSS)
Homomorphic secret sharing or HSS [18, 21, 22] is a crypto-
graphic primitive that allows a client to outsource the compu-
tation of a program (containing addition and multiplication
instructions) to two non-colluding servers such that each server
produces its share of the program output without learning the
original program inputs.
An HSS scheme has three procedures: HSS.Gen, HSS.Enc,
and HSS.Eval. To outsource a program z = I(x, y, . . .) over an
input space I , a client first invokes HSS.Gen to generate HSS
keys. These keys consist of a public key, pk, for an underlying
encryption scheme, and the shares of the corresponding secret
key, (e0 = sh
(s)
0 , e1 = sh
(s)
1 ). The client uses the public key
to run HSS.Enc and produce a set of ciphertexts, C, contain-
ing encryptions of the program inputs (x, y, . . .). The client
also produces two sets, S0 = {sh(x·s)0 , sh(y·s)0 , . . .} and S1 =
{sh(x·s)1 , sh(y·s)1 , . . .}, containing shares of the program inputs
times the secret key. The client sends (pk, e0, C, S0) to server
S0, and (pk, e1, C, S1) to server S1. Finally, server Sb locally
(without interaction with S1−b) runs HSS.Eval(eb, C, Sb, I)
and gets its share of the program output z.
Otak builds on BKS-LPR = (BKS-LPR.Gen, BKS-LPR.Enc,
BKS-LPR.Eval) [22] HSS scheme as it is the most efficient
HSS scheme in the literature. There are three notable aspects
of BKS-LPR. First, the input space I is the polynomial ring
Rp = Zp[x]/(xN + 1) consisting of all degree N − 1 polynomi-
als with coefficients in Zp. Second, the underlying encryption
scheme that BKS-LPR uses is the LPR scheme [74] with
plaintext space Rp. Third, a key instruction that BKS-LPR.Eval
supports is Mult. This instruction takes as inputs a LPR cipher-
text Cx for x ∈ Rp, and a share of an input y ∈ Rp times the
LPR secret key, that is, a share of y · s, and outputs a share of
the product x · y. That is, sh(x·y)b ← Mult(sh(y·s)b , Cx).
4.2 Promise and perils of BKS-LPR HSS
A key property of BKS-LPR is that it allows a client to out-
source computation to two servers that do not interact with
each other. However, as described, BKS-LPR is not suitable
for Beaver triple generation, for two reasons. First, BKS-LPR
requires three parties where one of them supplies BKS-LPR
keys and encodings (encryptions and shares) of program in-
puts. However, in Otak’s setup, there are only two parties—
machines M0 and M1. They have shares of a vector a and a
matrix B, and require shares of c = a · B. Therefore, how
should M0, M1 obtain (i) BKS-LPR keys, (ii) ciphertexts for
input a, and (iii) shares of B · s?
Second, the dimension N of the input space Rp is large,
for example, 212 or 213, to ensure the security of LPR cipher-
texts [2, 74]. But oftentimes the vector length in ML models,
denoted by n, is smaller than N. For instance, a CNN for the
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Otak’s protocol after its reducing-TEE-code step
• This protocol assumes the same parties and performs the same computation as the protocol in Figure 4.
Setup phase
1. M0 and M1 use Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [111] to run (pk, s)← BKS-LPR.Gen(1λ). Yao’s protocol outputs (pk, eb =
sh(s)b ) to Mb. Here, s is a secret key for the LPR encryption scheme.
2. The other step of setup is step 1 from Figure 4.
Model-loading phase
3. Mb samples sh
(B)
b ∈R Zn×mp .
4. M0 and M1 use Yao’s protocol to convert shares of each column of B, that is, sh
(B[i])
b for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, to sh(B[i]·s)b , where
B[i] ∈ Rp is the polynomial encoding of the column vector B[i]. The polynomial encoding is standard and based on an
application of Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) to ring Rp [22].
5. Other steps of model-loading are steps 3 and 4 from Figure 4.
Preprocessing phase
6. (Generate Beaver triple shares) Mb does the following.
(a) Samples sh(a)b ∈R Z1×np and converts it to its polynomial form sh(a)b .
(b) (Encrypts a) Sends Csh
(a)
b ← LPR.Enc(pk, sh(a)b ) to M1−b, receives Csh
(a)
1−b from M1−b, and computes Ca = Csh
(a)
b +Csh
(a)
1−b
using the additively homomorphic property of LPR.
(c) (Multiplies a with B[i]) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, computes sh(B[i]·a)b = Mult(sh(B[i]·s)b , Ca) using the HSS multiplication
instruction. Mb then converts sh
(B[i]·a)
b to its vector form sh
(B[i]⊙a)
b , where ⊙ denotes component-wise multiplication. Mb
computes sh(c[i])b =
∑j=n
j=1 sh
(B[i]⊙a)
b [j].
7. Finally, perform Step 6 from Figure 4.
Online phase is as in Figure 4
FIGURE 5—Otak’s protocol after its reducing-TEE-code design step. This protocol does not show the packing optimization, which is illustrated
separately in Figure 6.
MNIST dataset [69] has vectors with 128 entries [72]. When
n < N, a mapping of vectors or matrix rows (of a Beaver
triple) to degree N − 1 polynomials in Rp wastes space and
incurs unnecessary CPU and network overhead (relative to a
mapping that would not waste space in the polynomial).2
4.3 Otak’s protocol that incorporates BKS-LPR HSS
Figure 5 shows Otak’s protocol for the second part of its
reducing-TEE-code step. This protocol incorporates BKS-
LPR to generate Beaver triple shares, while addressing the
aforementioned issues, as follows.
First, the protocol adapts BKS-LPR for two parties by
using the general-purpose Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [111]
to simulate the client’s role. Yao’s protocol generates BKS-
LPR keys (step 1 under setup in Figure 5) and shares of B · s
to supply to the BKS-LPR Mult instruction (step 4 under
model-loading in Figure 5).
Second, the protocol allows M0 and M1 to generate LPR
ciphertexts for a using the additively homomorphic properties
of LPR. In particular, M0 and M1 generate ciphertexts for
shares of a, exchange them, and add them to get a ciphertext
2When n > N, the vector-matrix product is split into smaller products akin to
block-matrix multiplication. In this case, the last product has a vector of size
n− ⌊n/N⌋ · N, which is ≤ N.
Zero padding
n1 m1
n2
N
m2 m2
First triple Second triple Packed triple
n1+n2
a1 B1 B2a2 a1
a2
B1
B2
FIGURE 6—Packing scheme for triple generation.
for a (step 6b in Figure 5). With this change and the one above,
the first challenge of applying BKS-LPR to Beaver triple
generation is addressed.
Third, the protocol addresses the inefficiency caused by
mapping small vectors in Znp to degree N − 1 polynomials in
Rp by packing multiple smaller triples into an N-sized triple.
Figure 6 depicts the overall idea. Say that Otak needs to gener-
ate two triples (a1, B1, c1) and (a2, B2, c2) for different layers
of the same model, or different layers across models, or dif-
ferent requests to the same layer of a model. Then, instead of
running triple generation (step 6 in Figure 5) separately for the
two triples, Otak runs a single instance of triple generation.
Cost analysis. Relative to the protocol in Figure 4, the cost
of the setup and model-loading phases increases because of
the addition of Yao’s protocol. However, Yao is used only
during setup and model-loading phases, and thus its cost gets
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amortized across many inference requests, as setup runs once
and model-loading runs once per model.
The preprocessing phase adds inter-server network overhead
to generate ciphertexts for a (step 6b in Figure 5); this overhead
is a small multiple of a’s size due to the packing technique.
The preprocessing phase adds CPU cost, mainly due to the
calls to LPR encryption function and the HSS Mult instruction.
(The online phase does not change relative to Figure 4, so its
costs do not get affected.)
Security analysis. The protocol’s security follows from the
security of BKS-LPR and Yao’s garbled circuits. In partic-
ular, the protocol satisfies the single-TEE definition in §2.3.
Appendix C.1 contains the proof.
5 Details of distributing-trust step
The protocol has so far assumed a single TEE per server. In
particular,
(i) step 1 in Figure 4 uses the TEE Tb at server Sb to set up
a common seed for a PRF so that the TEEs at the two
servers generate the same sequence of random values,
(ii) step 6 in Figure 4 uses the TEE machine Tb at server Sb
to sample randomness r and output shrb to Mb, and
(iii) the same step uses the TEE machine Tb to run (k0, k1)←
FSS.Gen(1λ, f̂r()) and output FSS key kb to Mb.
In this section, we remove the single TEE limitation, by dis-
tributing the computation in these steps over multiple, hetero-
geneous TEE machines.
First off, in the multiple-TEE setting, both servers S0, S1
consist of a group of three TEEs denoted by T(0)0 , T
(1)
0 , T
(2)
0
and T(0)1 , T
(1)
1 , T
(2)
1 respectively.
Then, to distribute the first part above (under bullet (i)),
each pair of TEEs (T(i)0 , T
(i)
1 ) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} establishes a
common PRF seed, say seedi, using the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol [28, 34]. A common PRF seed ensures that
both TEE machines in a pair (where one comes from either
server) generate the same sequence of random values.
Next, to distribute the second part above (generation of r
under bullet (ii) above), each TEE samples randomness locally
and considers it to be its share of r. In more detail, let r be
a component of the randomness vector r, and r0, r1, r2 be
uniformly random elements in Zp such that r0 + r1 + r2 = r
(mod p). Then, each TEE T(i)b for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} executes the
procedure GenRand in Figure 4 to sample ri. Further, TEE T
(i)
b
sends a share of ri, that is, shrib , to Mb. Machine Mb receives
shares shr0b , sh
r1
b , and sh
r2
b from T
(0)
b , T
(1)
b , and T
(2)
b respectively,
and computes shrb = sh
r0
b + sh
r1
b + sh
r2
b .
Finally, to distribute the third part (FSS key generation
under bullet (iii) above), a natural starting point is to use a
general-purpose three-party MPC protocol [43, 111]. How-
ever, general-purpose protocols are expensive. Instead, Otak
observes that the task at hand is to compute FSS keys for only
GenRand (b, seedi):
ri ← PRFseedi(counter) (mod p)
shri0 ← PRFseedi(counter + 1) (mod p)
shri1 ← ri − shri0 (mod p)
return shrib
FIGURE 7—Procedure that TEE T(i)b runs to distributively generate
randomness needed for the BGI protocol (r in step 6 in Figure 4).
PRG
Correction
After 
correction:
PRG
Correction
FIGURE 8—Pictorial depiction of the underlying computation in
FSS.Gen [17, 19]. The procedure expands two paths in a binary tree;
for each node in the path, it invokes a PRG.
the point and interval functions as they can express all com-
mon non-linear functions (§3). Thus, Otak uses a customized
protocol for the point and interval functions, thereby reducing
overhead in comparison to a general solution. In the rest of
this section, we focus on this protocol; we first give a brief
overview of FSS.Gen and then describe the protocol.
Overview of FSS.Gen. The FSS scheme of Boyle et al. is
sophisticated [17, 19]. Moreover, one does not need to under-
stand its low-level details to understand Otak’s protocol. For
these reasons, we describe only the notable aspects of Boyle
et al.’s scheme.
Figure 8 shows the key idea behind FSS.Gen. Essentially,
the keys k0, k1 output by FSS.Gen are paths from root to leaf
nodes in two correlated trees. At each step of path traversal,
FSS.Gen takes a random string and performs two computa-
tions: (i) expands the random string to two random strings
for the two children, and (ii) corrects the value of the chil-
dren’s strings so that they satisfy a certain constraint. These
two computations are depicted in Figure 8 as the “PRG” (pseu-
dorandom number generator) and “correction” blocks. The
former is usually instantiated using AES and incurs significant
expense when performed inside MPC (we use ABY3 [82] in
our implementation; §6). Meanwhile, the correction step is
cheap as it mainly consists of XORs, which are typically effi-
cient in MPC. Therefore, Otak’s goal is to reduce the cost of
invoking the PRG.
Otak’s protocol for FSS.Gen. Otak’s idea is to bring the in-
vocation of the PRG “outside” of the general-purpose MPC
protocol. Suppose that when the three TEE machines at server
Sb, that is, T
(0)
b , T
(1)
b , T
(2)
b , reach the PRG step, they hold XOR-
shares of a string x ∈ {0, 1}λ that they have to expand by ap-
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plying a PRG, G. That is, T(j)b holds xj such that x0⊕x1⊕x2 = x.
Then, to obtain strings that are computationally indistinguish-
able from the shares of G(x), T(j)b does the following:
• Splits xj into three blocks xj = xj[0]∥xj[1]∥xj[2], where ∥
denotes string concatenation.
• Sends xj[i] and xj[k] (for i, k ∈ {0, 1, 2} such that i ̸= j, k ̸=
j) to T(i)b , T
(k)
b , respectively. After this step, T
(0)
b , T
(1)
b , and
T(2)b , obtain x[0], x[1], and x[2], respectively. That is, the
TEE machines obtain blocks of x from their shares of x.
• Invokes a PRG locally, say g, over x[j] to expand it to the
same length as the output of G(x).
• Treats the output of g as its XOR-share of G(x), and contin-
ues onto the next step in FSS.Gen.
Security and cost analysis. Appendix B.1 proves that the out-
put of g(x[j]) is indistinguishable from a share of G(x) even if
two blocks of the seed x of G are revealed to a distinguisher.
Further, Appendix C.2 proves that Otak’s protocol with multi-
ple TEEs meets the multiple-TEE security definition in §2.3.
Meanwhile, the benefit of the PRG optimization is a reduc-
tion in both CPU and network overhead relative to a general
MPC solution, as each TEE invokes a PRG natively on its
CPU, rather than inside the MPC framework. For instance, the
network transfers between the TEE machines reduce from
1.6 MB in ABY3 [82] to 60 KB with the optimization (§7.1).
6 Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of Otak (§2.2, §3–§5).
Our prototype builds on existing libraries. It implements the
FSS primitives and the BGI protocol (§3) using the libFSS
library [107]. It implements the BKS-LPR HSS scheme and
our extensions to the scheme (§4) on top of Microsoft’s SEAL
library [90]. We borrow small pieces of code from ABY3 [82]
and OpenSSL to implement the secure computation protocol
for FSS.Gen (§5) atop the Asylo framework [45] for Intel
SGX. Finally, Otak’s various components (§2.2) communicate
over the gRPC RPC framework [50]. In total, Otak’s proto-
type adds 17,000 lines of C++ on top of existing libraries; this
number is measured using the sloccount Linux utility [108].
7 Evaluation
Our evaluation answers the following questions:
1. What are Otak’s overheads for computing vector-matrix
products, ML non-linear functions, and performing infer-
ence over popular ML models?
2. How do Otak’s overheads compare to those of the state-
of-the-art cryptography-based works?
3. How accurately can Otak perform inference?
4. How big is Otak’s software TCB and how does its size
compare to the TCB of systems that run ML inference
completely inside TEEs?
RAM network
vendor type vCPUs (GB) (Gbps) processor loc.
AWS m5.4xlarge 16 64 10 Xeon CA
Azure D16s-v3 16 64 8 Xeon CA
Azure L8s-v2 8 64 3.2 AMD EPYC WA
Azure DC1s-v2 1 4 2 Xeon-SGX VA
FIGURE 9—Machines used in our experiments.
CPU time
VecToPoly PolyToVec LPR.Enc HSS.Mult
for HSS 185.0 µs 168.4 µs 4.9 ms 3.6 ms
CPU time network transfers
for FSS Single TEE Multiple TEEs Multiple TEEs
Gen (pt. fn.) 47.2 µs 0.33 ms 43.8 KB
Eval (pt. fn.) 22.1 µs 147.5 µs N/A
Gen (int. fn.) 63.7 µs 0.44 ms 55.7 KB
Eval (int. fn.) 28.8 µs 169.3 µs N/A
FIGURE 10—CPU times and network transfers for HSS, FSS proce-
dures, averaged over 1000 runs. Standard deviations (not shown) are
within 1% percent of the means. Network transfers are intra-domain.
A summary of our evaluation results is as follows:
• Otak’s CPU and network overhead for computing a vector-
matrix product is at least 1.5–2.2× and 1–60× lower de-
pending on vector-matrix dimensions in comparison to state-
of-the-art cryptography-based works (§7.2).
• Otak’s CPU overhead is 11.6–45.1× higher for computing a
non-linear function depending on the function in compar-
ison to the popular Yao method in prior work. However,
Otak’s network overhead is 121.9–2819× lower (§7.3).
• Otak’s CPU overhead for private inference is higher than
prior state-of-the work cryptography-based work by at most
14.2×, while its inter-server network overhead is 46.4–
1448× lower depending on the ML model (§7.4).
• Given that CPU is cheaper than network resource, Otak’s
dollar cost for ML inference is 5.4–385× lower than prior
work depending on the ML model (§7.4).
• Otak’s inference accuracy is 1–2% lower than TensorFlow’s
as it represents floating-point as fixed-point numbers (§7.4).
• Otak runs 1,300 lines of code inside its TEEs, which is
14.6–29.2× lower than the amount of code run inside TEEs
by prior TEE-based works (§7.5).
Method and setup. We compare Otak’s two variants with
single and multiple TEEs per server, which we call Otak-
STEE and Otak-MTEE, to several state-of-the-art baseline
systems. For the performance-related questions, we compare
Otak’s variants to the following cryptography-based systems.
• SecureML [83] and SPDZ [27, 33, 64] are the state-of-
the-art systems for the Otak-like setting where inference
runs over two non-colluding servers that hold secret shares
of model parameters and data points. We run the code of
these systems while configuring them to provide honest-but-
curious security.
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FIGURE 11—CPU times and network transfers for Otak and the baseline systems for privately computing vector-matrix products.
• DELPHI [80] (which optimizes Gazelle [62]) is a recent
optimized 2PC system that runs inference between a client
(that owns data points) and a server (that owns model pa-
rameters). We run DELPHI as a two-server system where
one server owns model parameters and the other owns data
points. Note that Otak’s comparison to DELPHI is not
apples-to-apples as Otak further secret shares model param-
eters and data points between the two servers so that neither
learns them. However, we include DELPHI as it is a recent
optimized 2PC system.
For the TCB related questions, we compare Otak to two SGX-
based systems: TF Trusted and PRIVADO. TF Trusted is op-
timized to run TensorFlow Lite inside an Intel SGX TEE [25],
while PRIVADO runs a reduced Torch ML framework in-
side SGX [99]. We pick these two systems from the set of
SGX-based systems as their TCBs are either reported or can
be measured from their publicly available code.
We run a series of experiments to answer the evalua-
tion questions above. Our experiments deploy a system and
vary parameters such as vector-matrix dimensions, the non-
linear function (ReLU, Maxpool, Sigmoid, Tanh, Argmax),
and the ML model. For the latter, we use four datasets
(MNIST [69], CIFAR-10 [66], CIFAR-100 [66], and ISO-
LET [35]) and five ML model architectures (two FNNs and
three CNNs) including the 32-layer ResNet-32 CNN [52]
(Appendix D gives more details). These datasets and models
perform a variety of inference tasks including image classi-
fication and speech recognition. Our experiments measure
inference accuracy for these models as well as resource con-
sumption: CPU time using std::clock(), real time (latency)
using std::chrono::high_resolution_clock, and net-
work transfers using Linux kernel’s /proc/net/dev.
Our testbed (Figure 9) is a set of machines on Amazon
EC2 and Microsoft Azure. Within these cloud providers, we
use both general-purpose and TEE machines. Cloud providers
currently offer only Intel SGX-based TEEs [88]; we use two
such machines and a regular AMD machine as Otak-MTEE’s
three TEEs. In a real deployment, Otak-MTEE would use
three different TEEs.
7.1 Microbenchmarks
We begin by presenting CPU and network transfers for primi-
tive operations in Otak’s cryptographic protocols (§3, §4, §5).
Figure 10 shows these microbenchmarks.
For computing vector-matrix products, Otak generates
Beaver triple shares using the BKS-LPR scheme (§4.3). The
first part of the microbenchmarks figure shows the CPU times
for BKS-LPR operations: converting a vector to its polyno-
mial encoding and back (used in step 4 and step 6c in Figure 5),
generating LPR ciphertexts (step 6b in Figure 5), and perform-
ing BKS-LPR multiplication (step 6c in Figure 5). These
microbenchmarks are over an m5.4xlarge EC2 instance (Fig-
ure 9). Note that we configure BKS-LPR for polynomials with
N = 8,192 coefficients, where each coefficient is up to 52-bits.
These parameters are chosen according to the homomorphic
encryption standard for a 128-bit security [2].
For computing non-linear functions such as ReLU, Otak
relies on the FSS scheme that supports point and interval
functions (§3, §5). The second part of the microbenchmarks
figure shows CPU times and network transfers (between TEE
machines) for FSS procedures (FSS.Gen, FSS.Eval) for the
two functions.
7.2 Overheads of computing vector-matrix products
Figure 11 shows the CPU times and (wide-area) network trans-
fers of various systems for computing vector-matrix products
while varying the dimensions of the vector and the matrix.
The “small”, “medium”, and “large” dimensions correspond
to matrices with 128× 128, 1024× 1024, 8192× 8192 entries.
CPU overhead. For a particular matrix dimension, Otak
(whose two variants do not differ in how they compute vector-
matrix products), consumes a lower amount of CPU than
SecureML, SPDZ (its both variants based on additive and
somewhat homomorphic encryption), and DELPHI. For in-
stance, Otak’s CPU consumption is 6.7–98.2× lower than Se-
cureML’s, and 1.5–2.2× lower than DELPHI’s. SecureML
consumes a high amount of CPU because it uses the expen-
sive number-theoretic Paillier additive homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme [87]. SPDZ and DELPHI use modern additively
homomorphic encryption schemes along-with packing tech-
niques [62]. Meanwhile, Otak improves over these works by
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CPU
network
(local)
network
(wide-area)
ReLU
Yao 0.45 ms 0 8.3 KB
Otak-STEE 1.3 ms 13.9 KB 18.0 B
Otak-MTEE 5.8 ms 336.8 KB 18.0 B
Sigmoid
Yao 1.3 ms 0 46.8 KB
Otak-STEE 3.4 ms 37.7 KB 17.0 B
Otak-MTEE 18.5 ms 989.1 KB 17.0 B
Tanh
Yao 1.44 ms 0 48.6 KB
Otak-STEE 3.3 ms 37.8 KB 18.0 B
Otak-MTEE 16.7 ms 989.9 KB 18.0 B
MaxPool
Yao 0.45 ms 0 12.2 KB
Otak-STEE 2.9 ms 23.5 KB 89.0 B
Otak-MTEE 20.3 ms 1.2 MB 89.0 B
Argmax
Yao 0.48 ms 0 12.5 KB
Otak-STEE 3.2 ms 24.8 KB 105.0 B
Otak-MTEE 21.6 ms 1.3 MB 105.0 B
FIGURE 12—CPU times and network transfers for computing non-
linear functions using Yao and Otak. The overheads of MaxPool and
Argmax depend linearly on the number of input entries; here, we
show overhead per entry.
using HSS which enables even more efficient packing for
Beaver triple generation (§4.3).
Network overhead. Like for CPU, Otak’s network transfers
are lower than those in prior works. For instance, Otak’s over-
head is 1–60× lower than DELPHI’s. This is because DEL-
PHI does not optimally use the domain of its underlying en-
cryption scheme; Otak, instead, optimizes the input domain of
HSS instructions (§4.3). Note than for “large” matrix dimen-
sions when the size of the vectors equals the dimension of the
underlying polynomial ring (8,192), Otak’s overhead is same
as DELPHI’s as packing does not take effect. However, for
other dimensions, Otak’s packing helps reduce overhead.
7.3 Overheads of computing non-linear functions
Figure 12 shows the overheads of privately computing ReLU,
Maxpool, Sigmoid, Tanh, and Argmax using Otak’s FSS-based
protocol (§3, §5) and Yao’s garbled circuits—the protocol
commonly used in prior two-party systems.
At a high level, Yao’s protocol incurs lower CPU consump-
tion than Otak, especially when Otak uses multiple TEEs. The
reason is that the FSS.Eval procedure is more expensive than
the evaluation procedure of a Yao’s garbled circuit. Besides,
the use of MPC to generate FSS keys adds CPU expense for
the multiple TEE case. On the other hand, Yao incurs high
wide-area network transfers as it exchanges a large Boolean
circuit representing of the non-linear function between the two
servers. In contrast, Otak’s wide-area network transfers are
small (for example, by a factor of 461× for ReLU) due to the
network-efficient online phase of Otak’s FSS-based BGI pro-
tocol (step 9 in Figure 4). Otak does incur intra-domain (local)
transfers between TEE machines and between TEE machines
and general-purpose machines (step 6 in Figure 4). However,
local transfers are cheap. Indeed, popular cloud providers do
not charge for intra-domain network transfers within a geo-
graphical zone [48, 78]. Overall, the reduction in expensive
wide-area network overhead outweighs the increase in cheaper
CPU and local network transfers.
The CPU and network costs for Otak follow from mi-
crobenchmarks (Figure 10). For instance, ReLU calls the in-
terval function six times. According to Figure 10, six calls to
the interval function with multiple TEEs incurs 334.2 KB in
local transfers, which is roughly what Figure 12 reports.
7.4 Overheads of private inference
CPU and network overhead. Figure 13 shows CPU and (wide-
area) network use for the various systems and ML models.
Otak’s CPU time is higher than the CPU time in prior work.
The reason is that Otak requires more CPU for non-linear func-
tions (§7.3), especially when it uses multiple TEEs. However,
Otak reduces network transfers (§7.2, §7.3) significantly rel-
ative to prior work. For instance, for the ResNet-32 CNN
model over the CIFAR-100 dataset (cluster labeled C100-R32
in Figure 13), Otak’s both variants incur 60 MB of wide-area
network transfers whereas DELPHI consumes 6 GB, SPDZ
with additive homomorphic encryption (SPDZ-AHE) con-
sumes 53.3 GB, and SPDZ with somewhat homomorphic
encryption consumes 96.4 GB. Note that SecureML (which
we do not show in the figure) currently only implements the
ReLU function, so it can encode just the MNIST-FNN (M-
FNN) model. For this model, its CPU and network overhead is
9.8× and 46.4×, respectively, higher than Otak’s.
Dollar costs. Otak’s CPU use is higher than prior work while
network use is lower. To compare the systems using a common
metric, we convert their resource use to a dollar amount.
Figure 14 shows estimated dollar costs for private inference
for the various systems. To do the conversion from resource
overhead to dollars, we use a pricing model derived from
the machine and bandwidth prices of Azure and AWS (Ap-
pendix E). This pricing model charges $0.015–$0.079 for one
hour of CPU time depending on machine type (SGX versus
non-SGX), $0.05 for one GB of outbound network traffic,
and zero for local network transfers. The figure shows that
Otak’s dollar cost, depending on Otak’s variant, is 9.6–24×
lower than SecureML’s, 87–4360× lower than SPDZ’s, and
5.4–55.6× lower than DELPHI’s.
Inference latency. Figure 15 shows the latency of performing
inference for the various systems (SecureML is not depicted
in the figure, and its latency for M-FNN is 150.2 ms). Overall,
Otak takes less time than SecureML (by 2.45×) and SPDZ (by
2.62–262×), but longer than DELPHI (by up to 10.2×) to per-
form inference. The difference to DELPHI is fundamental—
DELPHI targets a non-outsourced setting where model param-
eters are in plaintext while Otak hides the model parameters
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FIGURE 13—CPU time and (wide-area) network transfers for Otak and baseline systems for various ML models. DELPHI does not support
Tanh for ISOLET-FNN (I-FNN). Otak’s CPU times are higher than prior work’s CPU time. However, Otak reduces the expensive network
transfers. SecureML (not shown in the figure) currently only implements the ReLU function, and can, therefore, encode just the MNIST-FNN
(M-FNN) model. For this model, its CPU and network overhead is 9.8× and 46.4×, respectively, higher than Otak-MTEE’s.
I-FNN M-FNN M-CNN C10-CNN C100-R32
SecureML - $0.48 - - -
SPDZ-AHE $12.15 $10.26 $130.82 $2129.13 $4918.67
SPDZ-SHE $11.56 $17.75 $242.38 $4044.48 $9337.42
DELPHI - $0.48 $1.67 $169.73 $301.71
Otak-STEE ¢0.84 $0.02 $0.03 $5.63 $10.68
Otak-MTEE $0.03 $0.05 $0.15 $31.43 $55.94
FIGURE 14—Dollar costs for 1000 private predictions. Otak’s dollar
costs are lower as it reduces wide-area network transfers substantially.
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FIGURE 15—Inference latency for Otak and baseline systems. DEL-
PHI does not support Tanh for I-FNN. Otak’s difference to DELPHI
is fundamental—DELPHI targets a non-outsourced setting where
model parameters are in plaintext while Otak hides the model pa-
rameters from the service provider. This difference in setting enables
DELPHI to have a very efficient online phase [80].
from the provider. Owing to the difference in setting, DEL-
PHI’s operations are cheaper than Otak’s in its online phase.
Client-side costs for the data point owner are small. For
instance, for the largest model (C100-R32), the data point
owner expends 2 ms in CPU time and 61.2 KB in network
transfers to send secret shares of input image and receive the
output label.
Accuracy. We compare Otak’s inference accuracy against Ten-
sorFlow’s for I-FNN, M-FNN, M-CNN, C10-CNN, and C100-
R32. Otak outputs the correct label 97.5%, 97.6%, 97.2%,
81.6%, and 68.3% of the time, while TensorFlow outputs cor-
rect label 99.0%, 97.8%, 98.3%, 82.7%, and 69.8% of times.
Otak’s accuracy is 1-2% lower than TensorFlow’s because
it approximates floating-point as fixed-point numbers while
TensorFlow does not require such approximation (§3).
7.5 Trusted computing base (TCB)
Otak improves over cryptography-based solutions by using
TEEs. However, a downside is the trust on TEEs, which Otak
mitigates by keeping the size of the functionality inside the
TEE small and distributing trust over heterogeneous TEEs.
Here, we report the size of the functionality Otak runs inside
its TEEs in terms of source lines of code and compare it to the
lines of code inside TEEs for prior TEE-based systems.
Otak’s code inside its TEEs is 1,300 lines. This TCB is
14.6× and 29.2× lower than the TCB sizes of PRIVADO
and TF trusted, which have 19K and 38K source lines of
code inside the TEE [25, 99]. (For PRIVADO we report TCB
size from their paper; for TF Trusted [25], we count only the
included header files in the TEE code as opposed to the entire
codebase of library dependencies [50, 98].)
8 Conclusion
Outsourced private ML inference over two servers is an im-
portant problem and has attracted considerable attention. Prior
systems for this problem employ two-party secure compu-
tation (2PC) protocols that incur high overhead. This paper
asked the question, can we accelerate 2PC for this setting by
employing trusted-hardware in a limited capacity, and found
the results to be encouraging. In particular, one can acceler-
ate 2PC by one to two orders of magnitude (§7), by building
on recent primitives such as function and homomorphic se-
cret sharing (§3–§5)—while restricting trusted-hardware to a
small computation during preprocessing, and without trusting
the hardware of a particular vendor. By demonstrating these
promising results, this paper opens up new avenues—not just
for two-server outsourced ML inference but also for private
ML inference in other settings such as three servers.
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A MaxPool and Argmax
As mentioned earlier (§3), efficient FSS constructions [17, 19,
20] currently exist only for two functions: a point function
and an interval function. These functions can encode a spline
function [20], which in turn can encode ReLU, and close
approximations of Sigmoid and Tanh [8]. However, a spline
cannot directly encode the MaxPool and Argmax functions.
Here, we describe how Otak encodes MaxPool and Argmax
using a composition of the point and interval functions.
A.1 Maxpool
Note that max over an array of inputs can be expressed using
multiple instances of max over two inputs using a tournament-
like tree structure. So we focus on encoding the latter.
Problem with a straightforward encoding. A straightfor-
ward approach to expressing the max of two elements x, y ∈ Z
is to use the sign function:
sign(x− y) =
{
1 (+ve), if z ≥ 0;
0 (-ve), otherwise.
If the sign of x − y is 1, then the max equals x, else the max
equals y. However, as noted earlier (§3), the reasoning above
does not work when operating over elements of Zp (instead of
elements of Z) as Zp is not an ordered ring (when encoding
both positive and negative integers).
Otak’s encoding of max. Observe that sign(x− y) gives the
right answer when both x and y have the same sign, that is,
when they are either both positive or both negative. For this
case, we can write max(x, y) = ReLU(x− y)+ y. For the case
when x and y have different signs, we can write max(x, y) =
ReLU(x) + ReLU(y). Therefore, Otak expresses max as
max(x, y) =
{
ReLU(x− y) + y, if sign(x) = sign(y);
ReLU(x) + ReLU(y), otherwise.
To combine the two cases, define a function b(x, y) as
b(x, y) =
{
1, if sign(x) = sign(y);
0, otherwise.
Then,
max(x, y) = b(x, y) · (ReLU(x− y) + y)
+ (1− b(x, y)) · (ReLU(x) + ReLU(y)).
Let pf βα (·) denote the point function that outputs β at the point
α and zero otherwise. Then, given the value of ReLU(x) +
ReLU(y), one can see that pf 10 (ReLU(x) + ReLU(y)) equals
1 if both x and y are negative and zero otherwise. Similarly,
pf 10 (ReLU(x) +ReLU(y)− x− y) equals 1 if both x and y are
positive and zero otherwise. Hence, b(x, y) can be defined as
b(x, y) = pf 10 (ReLU(x) + ReLU(y))
+ pf 10 (ReLU(x) + ReLU(y)− x− y).
With the above definition of the function b(·, ·), Otak can
express max using point and interval functions. Note that
Otak evaluates max over two rounds. In the first round, it
computes the shares of the inner parts of the functions (that
is, ReLU(x− y) + y and ReLU(x) + ReLU(y)), while in the
second round, it computes the outer parts of the functions.
A.2 Argmax
Like for Maxpool, Otak’s goal is to express Argmax in terms
of point and interval functions.
Recall that the Argmax function outputs the index of the
maximum entry in an array. Let the inputs to argmax be xi
for i ∈ [1, n] and let µ equal the biggest value, that is, µ =
max({xi}), computed using MaxPool (Appendix A.1). Then,
one can express the output of argmax as an array of n entries,
with 0 at the i-th entry if xi ̸= µ, and the index i at the i-th
entry if xi = µ.
Let pf βα (·) denote the point function that outputs β at the
point α and zero otherwise. Then, we define i-th entry of the
Argmax’s output as pf i0(xi − µ), where µ = max({xi}).
B Security of the distributing-trust step
Lemma B.1. Let G : X → Y be a PRG. Define G′ : X × X ×
X → Y as G′(x1, x2, x3) = G(x1)⊕ G(x2)⊕ G(x3). Then, the
following holds: for every i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and i ̸= j,
{(G′(x1, x2, x3), xi, xj)}
x1,x2,x3
$←−X ≈c {(u, xi, xj)}xi,xj $←−X
u
$←−U
(≈c denotes computational indistinguishability).
In other words, G′ is a PRG and moreover, is secure even
if any two blocks of the seed of the PRG is revealed to a
distinguisher.
Proof. It suffices to prove the case when i = 2, j = 3 and
the other cases follow symmetrically. From the security of G,
which says that an output of G is indistinguishable from an
element sampled uniformly at random, the following holds:
{(G(x1)⊕ G(x2)⊕ G(x3), x2, x3)}
x1,x2,x3
$←−X
≈c {(u⊕ G(x2)⊕ G(x3), x2, x3)}
x2,x3
$←−X
u
$←−U
Since XOR-ing the uniform distribution with any fixed value
still gives the same distribution, we have the following:
{(u⊕ G(x2)⊕ G(x3), x2, x3)}
x2,x3
$←−X
u
$←−U
≡ {(u, x2, x3)}
x2,x3
$←−X
u
$←−U
(≡ denotes perfect indistinguishability). Combining the above
two observations, we have the proof of the lemma.
Theorem B.1. Let Fgen : (1λ, b, f̂r) 7→ kb for b ∈ {0, 1}
denote the functionality (from §5) that outputs BGI keys to Mb.
For any PPT adversaryA corrupting Mb, T(i)b for i ∈ {0, 1, 2},
with access to TEEs T(j)b , T
(k)
b , for j, k ∈ {0, 1, 2} and j ̸=
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i, k ̸= i, for every large enough security parameter λ, there
exists a PPT simulator Sim such that the following holds:
For every b ∈ {0, 1}, randomness rb ∈ {0, 1}poly(λ)
ViewF
(j)
b ,F(k)b
A (1
λ, b ; r) ≈c,ϵ Sim(1λ, b, r, kb)
Remark. The proof essentially follows from Lemma B.1 and
the simulation security of the ABY3 protocol in the honest-
majority setting.
C Security Proof
We first present the proof for the single-TEE case and later,
we show how to extend this proof to the multiple-TEE setting.
C.1 Single-TEE
Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that compromises the
general purpose machine Mb and TEE machine Tb for some
b ∈ {0, 1}. We then construct a PPT simulator Sim as follows.
1. Sim chooses a uniform random tape for Mb, Tb.
2. In setup phase:
(a) Sim simulates the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
(b) Sim runs the corresponding simulator of Yao’s pro-
tocol (see [71] for its description) such that the sim-
ulated circuit outputs the simulated share (pk, eb),
of the HSS keys, to machine Mb.
3. In model-loading phase: for every layer in the model,
(a) Sim runs the corresponding simulator of Yao’s
protocol [71]; the simulated garbled circuit is pro-
grammed to output an element in R2q, chosen uni-
formly at random, to machine Mb.
(b) Sim picks a matrix in Zm×np , uniformly at random,
for layer parameters, and sends it to machine Mb.
4. In preprocessing phase: for every layer in the model,
(a) Simulator Sim gets the public key pk from the simu-
lated setup phase. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, it sends
encryption of 0 to Mb.
(b) Sim computes the simulator of the BGI protocol,
on input (1λ, b), to obtain the simulated key kb. The
functionality inside Tb will now output the key kb.
5. In online phase:
(a) Simulator Sim sends shares sh0b, chosen uniformly
at random, to machine Mb.
(b) For every layer of the ML model, Sim computes the
simulator of the secure Beaver multiplication.
(c) At the end of every execution of the FSS protocol
(one per non-linear layer), the simulator sends a
share, chosen uniformly at random, to Mb.
We show that the real world distributions is computationally in-
distinguishable to the simulated distributions via the standard
hybrid argument.
1. Hyb0 : This corresponds to the real world distribution
where the model-owner, the datapoint-owner, secure hard-
ware machine Tb, and general-purpose machine M1−b
execute the system as mentioned in the description of the
protocol.
2. Hyb1: In this hybrid, the simulator for the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange is executed. Hyb0 ≈c Hyb1 follows from
the simulation security of the DH key exchange.
3. Hyb2 : In this hybrid, we call the simulator of Yao’s
protocol on input 1λ and the circuit Cirsetup that out-
puts honestly generated BKS-LPR keys: pk, eb ∈R R2q.
Hyb1 ≈c Hyb2 follows from the simulation security of
Yao’s protocol.
4. Hyb3 : In this hybrid, we modify Cirsetup such that it out-
puts simulated BKS-LPR keys: pk, eb ∈R R2q to machine
Mb. Hyb2 ≈c Hyb3 follows from the fact that honestly
generated BKS-LPR key is indistinguishable from the
simulated key.
5. Hyb4: In this hybrid, we again call the simulator of Yao’s
protocol SimYao on input sh
B[i]
b and the circuit Cirtransform
that outputs additive secret shares shB[i]·sb ∈ R2q for each
i-th column ∈ {1, ..., m} to machine Mb. Hyb3 ≈c Hyb4
due to the simulation security of Yao’s protocol.
6. Hyb5: In this hybrid, we modify Cirtransform such that it
outputs a value in R2q, chosen uniformly at random, for
each i-th column ∈ {1, ..., m} to machine Mb. Hyb4 is
identical to Hyb5 due to the perfect security of the secret
shares.
7. Hyb6: In this hybrid, we change the inputs sent by the
model-owner and the machine M1−b to the general-
purpose machine Mb. Instead of sending secret shares
of the model parameters Y, model-owner sends a value
in Zn×mp , chosen uniformly at random. Similarly, instead
of sending secret shares sh(Y−B)b−1 , machine Mb−1 sends
a value in Zm×np , chosen uniformly at random. Hyb5 is
identical to Hyb6 due to the perfect security of additive
secret sharing scheme.
8. Hyb7.(j) for jth layer: In this hybrid, we change the ci-
phertext sent by the machine Mb−1 to machine Mb in the
execution of the jth layer. Specifically, instead of sending
encryption of shab−1, machine Mb−1 sends encryption of
0 ∈ Z1×np .
The following holds from the semantic security of the
LPR scheme: (i) for j ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1}, where L is
the number of layers, Hyb7.(j) ≈c Hyb7.(j+1) and, (iii)
Hyb6 ≈c Hyb7.(1).
9. Hyb8: In this hybrid, we invoke the simulator of BGI
protocol to obtained simulated key kb that is then sent
to Mb. Hyb8 ≈c Hyb7.(L) due to the security of the BGI
protocol.
10. Hyb9: This corresponds to the output distribution of Sim.
Hybrids Hyb8 and Hyb9 are identically distributed.
C.2 Multiple-TEE
We now focus on the setting when there are multiple TEEs.
Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that compromises
the general purpose machine Mb and TEE machine T
(i)
b for
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some b ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Let j, k be such that j ̸= i and
j ̸= k. We then construct a PPT simulator Sim as follows.
1. Sim chooses a uniform random tape for Mb, T
(i)
b . Sim
simulates the other TEEs T jb, T
k
b , where i ̸= j ∧ i ̸= k.
2. In setup phase: execute the setup phase of the simulator
described in the single-TEE setting.
3. In model-loading phase: execute the model-loading
phase of the simulator in the single-TEE setting.
4. In preprocessing phase: for every layer in the ML
model,
(a) Same as the Single-TEE case.
(b) Sim runs the simulator of Theorem B.1 and outputs
simulated BGI key kb to the machine Mb.
5. In online phase: execute the online phase of the simula-
tor described in the single-TEE setting.
We show that the real world distributions is computationally in-
distinguishable to the simulated distributions via the standard
hybrid argument.
1. Hyb0 : This corresponds to the real world distribution
where the model-owner, the datapoint-owner, secure hard-
ware machine T jb, T
k
b , and general-purpose machine M1−b
execute the system as mentioned in the description of the
protocol.
2. Hyb1.(i,1): In this hybrid, the Fgen functionality for gen-
erating the BGI keys for the ith layer is simulated using
the simulator of Fgen from Theorem B.1. The simulator
of Fgen receives as input the BGI key kb for the ith layer.
3. Hyb0.(i,2): In this hybrid, the simulator for the ith layer
Fgen protocol receives as input kb, where kb is generated
by computing the simulator of the BGI scheme.
Hyb0.(i,1) ≈c Hyb0.(i,2) follows from the security of the
BGI scheme. Hyb0.(i,2) ≈c Hyb0.(i+1,1), for i < L where
L is the number of the layers in the ML model, follows
from the simulation security of the Fgen protocol.
4. Hybrids Hyb1 to Hyb8 are the same as described in the
single-TEE setting.
Hyb0.(L,2) ≈c Hyb1 follows from the simulation security
of the DH key exchange.
D Workloads
M-FNN consists of 3 dense (that is, fully-connected) layers
with ReLU activations for each layer [68, 83]. I-FNN is com-
posed of two dense layers and uses Tanh activations [94].
M-CNN consists of one convolution layer with 5x5 filters,
one average pooling layer with 2x2 pool size, and two dense
layers that use ReLU activations [72]. C10-CNN uses seven
convolutional layers with 3x3 and 1x1 filters, two average
pooling layers with 2x2 pool size, and one fully-connected
output layer [72, 80]. Finally, C100-R32 uses 32 convolutional
layers with 3x3 filters, 30 ReLU activation layers, several add
layers (used by shortcut paths), one global average pooling
layer, and one fully-connected output layer [80]. We omit
stride and padding sizes of convolution layers here and refer
the reader to prior work for their details.
E Pricing model
For network transfers, we directly use the prices reported by
the cloud providers for inbound, outbound, and local data trans-
fers. To get the hourly CPU cost, we take the hourly machine
cost and split it into CPU cost and memory cost by making
a simplifying assumption that two-third of the total machine
cost is due to CPU and one-third is due to memory. In reality,
pricing resources is an involved task that also depends on fac-
tors such as business demand [5, 7]. Therefore, our derived
resource prices should only be treated as estimates.
Network pricing. Azure and AWS both do not charge for
inbound traffic or local network transfers. For outbound traffic,
both these providers charge at $0.5 per GB [6, 78].
CPU pricing. The hourly prices of m5.4xlarge, D16s-v3,
L8s-v2, and DC1s-v2 when reserved for three years are
$0.337, $0.406, $0.264, and $0.119, respectively [7, 79]. Com-
bining this data with the specifications of these machines
(that is, the number of CPUs and amount of RAM), and the
method described above, we get the following per hour CPU
cost: $0.015 for m5.4xlarge, $0.017 for D16s-v3, $0.022
for L8s-v2, and $0.079 for the SGX-enabled DC1s-v2.
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